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Human intell collector operations

*FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Field Manual Headquarters No.
2-22.3 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 6 September 2006
Human Intelligence Collector Operations


Traits of a HUMINT Collector 1-1 0

Chapter 1

Intelligence Battlefield Operating System 1-1

Intelligence Process 1-1

Human Intelligence 1-4

HUMINT Source 1-4

HUMINT Collection and Related Activities 1-7

Required Areas of Knowledge 1-12

Capabilities and Limitations 1-13

Chapter 2

Organization and Structure 2-1

HUMINT Control Organizations 2-2

HUMINT Analysis and Production Organizations 2-6

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
NOTE: All previous versions of this manual are obsolete. This document is identical in content to the version dated 6 September 2006. All previous versions of this manual should be destroyed in accordance with appropriate Army policies and reyulations.
'This publication supersedeJyM 34-52, 28 September 1992, and ST 2-22.7, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, April 2002.

6 September 2006 FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 ------------­
Chapter 3

Offensive Operations ...............................•............................................................ 3-1

Defensive Operations 3-2

Stability and Reconstruction Operations 3-3

Civil Support Operations 3-7

Military Operations in Urban Environment.. 3-8

HUMINT Collection Environments 3-8


Joint, Combined, and DOD HUMINT Organizations 3-10

Chapter 4

HUMINT and the Operations Process .4-1

HUMINT Command and Control .4-3

Technical Control.

Command and Support Relationships 4-4

HUMINT Requirements Management 4-5

HUMINT Mission Planning 4-15

Task Organization 4-18

Operational Considerations 4-19

Operations Plans, Operations Orders, and Annexes 4-21

Operational Coordination 4-22


Chapter 5

HUMINT Collection Operations 5-1

Human Source Contact Operations 5-2

Debriefing Operations 5-7

Liaison Operations 5-12

Interrogation Operations , 5-13

Types of Interrogation Operations 5-27


Chapter 6

Human Source Screening 6-1

Screening Operations 6-2

Screening Process 6-9

Screening Methodologies 6-11

Screening Requirements 6-12

ii FM 2-22.3 6 September 2006
Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Initial Data and Observations 6-13
Source Assessment 6-14
Other Types of Screening Operations 6-15

Collection Objectives 7-1
Research 7-1
HUMINT Collection Plan 7-8
Final Preparations 7-13

Approach Phase 8-1
Developing Rapport 8-3
Approach Techniques 8-6
Approach Strategies for Interrogation 8-20
Approach Strategies for Debriefing 8-21
Approach Strategies for Elicitation 8-22
Termination Phase 8-23

General Questioning Principles 9-1
Direct Questions 9-1
Elicitation 9-5
Leads 9-5
Detecting Deceit. 9-6
HUMINT Collection Aids 9-9
Recording Techniques 9-9
Questioning With an Analyst or a Technical Expert 9-11
, Third-Party Official and Hearsay Information 9-12
Conducting Map Tracking 9-13
Special Source Categories 9-16

Reporting Principles 10-1
Report Types 10-1
Reporting Architecture 10-5

6 September 2006 FM 2-22.3
Chapter 11

Advantages and Disadvantages of Interpreter Use 11-1

Methods of Interpreter Use 11-2

Sources of Interpreters 11-4

Interpretation Techniques 11-5

Training and Briefing the Interpreter 11-5

Placement of the Interpreter 11-6

Interactions With and Correction of the Interpreter 11-7

Interpreter Support in Report Writing 11-8

Evaluating the Interpreter 11-8

Managing an Interpreter Program 11-9


Chapter 12

Analytical Support to Operational Planning 12-1

Operational Analysis and Assessment... 12-3

Source Analysis 12-4

Single-Discipline HUMINT Analysis and Production 12-4

HUMINT Source Selection 12-19

Chapter 13

Automation 13-1

Collection Support Automation Requirements 13-2

Analytical Automation Requirements 13-3

Automation Systems 13-7

Communications 13-8


Section I. Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment

of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) A-1

Section II.
Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) ........A-47





Iv FM 2-22.3 6 September 2006





GLOSSARY Glossary-1

BIBLIOGRAPHy Bibliography-1





INDEX Index-1

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FM 2-22.3 _
This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical assets in support of the commander's intelligence needs. It outline&­

HUMINT operations.

The HUMINT collector's role within the intelligence operating system.

The roles and responsibilities of the HUMINT collectors and the roles of those providing the command, control, and technical support of HUMINT collection operations.

This manual expands upon the information contained in FM 2-0. It supersedes FM 34-52 and rescinds ST 2-22.7. It is consistent with doctrine in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, FM 6-0, and JP 2-0. In accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for use against any detainee, regardless of status or characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field Manual. Some of the approaches and techniques authorized and listed in this Field Manual also require additional specified approval before implementation.
This manual will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time to time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address lessons learned.
This manual provides the doctrinal guidance for HUMINT collectors and commanders and staffs of the MI organizations responsible for planning and executing HUMINT operations. This manual also serves as a reference for personnel developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); materiel and force structure; institutional and unit training; and standing operating procedures (SOPs), for HUMINT operations at all army echelons. In accordance with TRADOC Regulation 25-36, the doctrine in this field manual is not policy (in and of itself), but is "...a body of thought on how Army forces operate....[It] provides an authoritative guide for leaders and soldiers, while allowing freedom to adapt to circumstances."
This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. This manual also applies to DOD civilian employees and contractors with responsibility to engage in HUMINT collection activities. It is also intended for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, and Service Component Commands (SCC). Although this is Army doctrine, adaptations will have to be made by other Military Departments, based on each of their organizations and specific doctrine.
Material in this manual applies to the full range of military operations. Principles outlined also are valid under conditions involving use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.
This manual is intended for use by military, civilian, and civilian contractor HUMINT collectors, as well as commanders, staff officers, and military intelligence (MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the HUMINT collection effort.
HUMINT operations vary depending on the source of the information. It is essential that all HUMINT collectors understand that, whereas operations and sources may
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FM 2-22.3 _
differ, the handling and treatment of sources must be accomplished in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
Interrogation, the HUMINT subdiscipline responsible for MI exploitation of enemy personnel and their documents to answer the supported specific information requirements (SIRs), requires the HUMINT collector to be fully familiar with both the classification of the source and applicable law. The principles and techniques of HUMINT collection are to be used within the constraints established by US law including the following:

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GWS.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GPW.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GC.

• Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV. HUMINT collectors must understand specific terms used to identify categories of personnel when referring to the principles and techniques of interrogation. Determination of a detainee's status may take a significant time and may not be completed until well after the time of capture. Therefore, there will be no difference
in the treatment of a detainee of any status from the moment of capture until such a determination is made. The following terms are presented here and in the glossary.

Civilian Internee: A person detained or interned in the United States or in occupied territory for security reasons, or for protection, or because he or she has committed an offense against the detaining power, and who is entitled to "protected person" status under the GC.

Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW): A detained person, as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the GPW. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts that do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, an EPW may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories of personnel who have fallen into the power of the enemy; a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces, without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces.

Other Detainees: Persons in the custody of the US Armed Forces who have not been classified as an EPW (Article 4, GPW), retained personnel (Article 33, GPW), and Civilian Internee (Articles 27, 41, 48, and 78, GC) shall be treated as EPWs until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority; for example, by Article 5 Tribunal.

Retained Personnel: (See Articles 24 and 26, GWS.)

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FM 2-22.3 _
Official medical personnel of the armed forces exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and facilities. Chaplains attached to the armed forces.
Staff of National Red Cross Societies and that of other Volunteer Aid Societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist Medical Service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations.

Protected Persons: Include civilians entitled to protection under the GC, including those we retain in the course of a conflict, no matter what the reason.

Enemy Combatant: In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term "enemy combatant" includes both "lawful enemy compatants" and "unlawful enemy combatants." All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, ''Department of Defense Detainee Program", and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US law.

Lawful Enemy Combatant: Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections. under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular armed forces of a State Party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a State Party to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.
Unlawful Enemy Combatant: Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For the purposes of the war on terrorism, the term "unlawful enemy combatant" is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, AZ. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, ATZS-CDI-D (FM 2-22.3), U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017. Send comments and recommendations bye-mail to ATZS-FDT­ Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. Use of the terms ''he'' and ''him'' in this manual should be read as referring to both males and females unless otherwise expressly noted.
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FM 2-22.3
HUMINT Support, Planning, and Management
HUMINT collection activities include three general categories: screening, interrogation, and debriefing. In some cases these may be distinguished by legal distinctions between source categories such as between interrogation and debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the purpose of the questioning. Regardless of the type of activity, or goal of the collection effort, HUMINT collection operations must be characterized by effective support, planning, and management.
Chapter 1
INTELLIGENCE BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM 1-1. The Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) is one of seven operating systems--Intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support (CSS), and command and control-that enable commanders to build, employ, direct, and sustain combat power. The Intelligence BOS is a flexible force of Intelligence personnel, organizations, and equipment. Individually and collectively, these assets generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the environmental features required by a command planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Inherent within the Intelligence BOS is the capability to plan, direct, and synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; collect and process information; produce relevant intelligence; and disseminate intelligence and critical information in an understandable and presentable form to those who need it, when they need it. As one of the seven disciplines of the Intelligence BOS, HUMINT provides a capability to the supported commander in achieving information superiority on the battlefield.
1-2. Intelligence operations consist of the functions that constitute the
intelligence process: plan, prepare, collect, process, produce, and the
common tasks of analyze, disseminate, and assess that occur throughout
the intelligence process. Just as the activities of the operations process
overlap and recur as circumstances demand, so do the functions of the
intelligence process. Additionally, the analyze, disseminate, and assess tasks
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of the intelligence process occur continuously throughout the intelligence process. (See Figure 1-1.)
• Plan. This step of the intelligence process consists of activities that include assessing the situation, envisioning a desired outcome (also known as setting the vision), identifying pertinent information and intelligence requirements, developing a strategy for ISR operations to satisfy those requirements, directing intelligence operations, and synchronizing the ISR effort. The commander's intent, planning guidance, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) (priority information requi~ements [PIRs] and friendly force
information requirements [FFIRsD drive the planning of intelligence operations. Commanders must involve their supporting staff judge advocate (SJA) when planning intelligence operations (especially HUMINT operations). Planning, managing, and coordinating these operations are continuous activities necessary to obtain information and produce intelligence essential to decisionmakirig.

Prepare. This step includes those staff and leader activities that take place upon receiving the operations plan (OPLAN), operations order (OPORD), warning order (WARNO), or commander's intent to improve the unit's ability to execute tasks or missions and survive on the battlefield.

Collect. Recent ISR doctrine necessitates that the entire staff, especially the G3/S3 and G2/S2, must change their reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) mindset to conducting ISR. The staff must carefully focus ISR on the CCIR but also enable the quick re-tasking of units and assets as the situation changes. This doctrinal requirement ensures that the enemy situation, not just our OPLAN, "drives" ISR operations. Well-developed procedures and carefully planned flexibility to support emerging targets, changing requirements, and the need to support combat assessment are critical. The G3/S3 and G2/S2 play a critical role in this challenging task that is sometimes referred to as "fighting ISR" because it is so staff intensive during planning and execution (it is an operation within the operation). Elements of all units on the battlefield obtain information and data about enemy forces, activities, facilities, and resources as well as information concerning the environmental and geographical characteristics of a particular area.

Process.· This step converts relevant information into a form suitable for analysis, production, or immediate use by the commander. Processing also includes sorting through large amounts of collected information and intelligence (multidiscipline reports from the unit's ISR assets, lateral and higher echelon units and organizations, and non-MI elements in the battlespace). Processing identifies and exploits that information which is pertinent to the commander's intelligence requirements and facilitates situational understanding. Examples of processing include developing film, enhancing imagery, translating a document from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator, and

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correlating dissimilar or jumbled information by assembling like elements before the information is forwarded for analysis.
• Produce. In this step, the G2/S2 integrates evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted information from single or multiple sources and disciplines into finished intelligence products. Like collection operations, the G2/S2 must ensure the unit's information processing and intelligence production are prioritized and synchronized to support answering the collection requirements.
COMMANDER Facilitates Situational Understanding t Relevant Information (which includes Intelligence) ASSESS isa continuous function The Operations Process ~ provides guidance and focus which drives the Intelligence Process t ~ Commander's ANALYZE, DISSEMINATE, and ASSESS are continuous functions The Intelligence Process provides continuous intelligence input essential to the Operations Process
Figure 1-1. Intelligence Process.

1-3. For more information on the Intelligence process, see FM 2-0.
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1-4. HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector (military occupational specialties [MOSs] 97E, 351Y [formerly 351C], 351M [formerly 351E], 35E, and 35F), from people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.
1-5. HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to­

Conducting source operations.

Liaising with host nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts.

Eliciting information from select sources.

Debriefing US and allied forces and civilian personnel including refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third-country nationals, and local inhabitants.

Interrogating EPWs and other detainees.

Initially exploiting documents, media, and materiel.

Note. In accordance with Army regulatory and policy guidance, a select set of intelligence personnel may be trained and certified to conduct certain HUMINT tasks outside of those which are standard for their primary MOS. Such selection and training will qualify these personnel to conduct only those specific additional tasks, and will not constitute qualifications as a HUMINT collector.
1-6. A HUMINT source is a person from whom information can be obtained. The source may either possess first-or second-hand knowledge normally obtained through sight or hearing. Potential HUMINT sources include threat, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel. Categories of HUMINT sources include but are not limited to detainees, refugees, DPs, local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
1-7. For the purpose of this manual, a HUMINT collector is a person who is specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the purpose of answering intelligence information requirements. HUMINT collectors specifically include enlisted personnel in MOS 97E, Warrant Officers (WOs) in MOS 351M (351E) and MOS 351Y (351C), commissioned officers in MOS 35E and MOS 35F, select other specially trained MOSs, and their Federal civilian employee and civilian contractor counterparts. These specially trained and certified individuals are the only personnel authorized to conduct HUMINT collection operations, although CI agents also use HUMINT collection techniques in the conduct of CI operations. HUMINT
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collection operations must be conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 231O.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Additional policies and regulations apply to management of contractors engaged in HUMINT collection. (See Bibliography for additional references on contractor management.) HUMINT collectors are not to be confused with CI agents, MaS 97B and WO MaS 351L (351B). CI agents are trained and certified for, tasked with, and carry out the mission of denying the enemy the ability to collect information on the activities and intentions of friendly forces. Although personnel in 97E and 97B MOSs may use similar methods to carry out their missions, commanders should not use them interchangeably. See Figure 1-2 for HUMINT and CI functions.
1-8. Every HUMINT questioning session, regardless of the methodology used or the type of operation, consists of five phases. The five phases of HUMINT collection are planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting. They are generally sequential; however, reporting may occur at any point within the process when critical information is obtained and the approach techniques used will be reinforced as required through the questioning and termination phases.
Planning and Preparation
1-9. During this phase, the HUMINT collector conducts the necessary research and operational planning in preparation for a specific collection effort with a specific source. Chapter 7 discusses this phase in detail.
1-10. During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the conditions of control and rapport to gain the cooperation of the source and to facilitate information collection. Chapter 8 discusses approach and termination strategies in detail.
1-11. During the questioning phase, the HUMINT collector uses an interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation methodology to ask a source questions systematically on relevant topics, collect information in response to the intelligence tasking, and ascertain source veracity. Chapter 9 discusses questioning techniques in detail. (See Appendix B for a source and reliability matrix.)
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FM 2-22.3 _

HUMINT ROLE • Determine -Capabilities -Order of Battle -Vulnerabilities -Intentions TARGET • Adversary Decisionmaking Architecture FUNCTIONS • HUMINT Collection Activities -Tactical Questioning -Screening -Interrogation -Debriefing -Liaison -Human Source Operations -DOCEX -CEE Operations • Analysis -Link Diagrams -Patterns COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ROLE • Detect • Identify • Exploit • Neutralize TARGET • Adversary Intelligence Activities FUNCTIONS • Collection -Contact Operations -Tactical Source Operations • Investigation -Incidents -Anomalies • Operation -Agent Operations • Analysis -Link Diagrams -Patterns

Figure 1-2. HUMINT and CI Functions.
1-12. During the termination phase, the HUMINT collector completes a questioning session and establishes the necessary conditions for future collection from the same source by himself or another HUMINT collector. (See Chapter 8.)
1-13. During the reporting phase, the HUMINT collector writes, edits, and submits written, and possibly oral, reports on information collected in the course of a HUMINT collection effort. These reports will be reviewed, edited, and analyzed as they are forwarded through the appropriate channels. Chapter 10 discusses reporting in detail.

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1-14. HUMINT collection activities include these categories: tactical questioning, screening, interrogation, debriefing, liaison, human source contact operations (SCOs), document exploitation (DOCEX), and captured enemy equipment (CEE) operations. DOCEX and CEE operations are activities supported by HUMINT collection but usually are only conducted by HUMINT collectors when the CEE or captured enemy document (CED) is associated with a source being questioned. In some cases, these determinations may depend on legal distinctions between collection methods such as interrogation and debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the purpose of the questioning. For example, screening is used to identify the knowledgeability and cooperation of a source, as opposed to the other activities that are used to collect information for intelligence purposes.
1-15. The activities may be conducted interactively. For example, a HUMINT collector may be screening a potential source. During the course of the screening, the HUMINT collector identifies that the individual has information that can answer requirements. He might at that point debrief or interrogate the source on that specific area. He will then return to screening the source to identify other potential areas of interest.
1-16. HUMINT collection activities vary depending on the source of the information. Once the type of activity has been determined, leaders use the process of plan, prepare, execute, and assess to conduct the activity. The following are the different types of HUMINT collection activities.
1-17. Tactical questioning is expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value. Tactical questioning is generally performed by members of patrols, but can be done by any DOD personnel. (See ST 2-91.6.)
1-18. Screening is the process of identifying and assessing the areas of knowledge, cooperation, and possible approach techniques for an individual who has information of intelligence value. Indicators and discriminators used in screening can range from general appearance, possessions, and attitude to specific questions to assess areas of knowledge and degree of cooperation to establish if an individual matches a predetermined source profile. Screening is not in itself an intelligence collection technique but a timesaving measure that identifies those individuals most likely to have information of value.
1-19. Screening operations are conducted to identify the level of knowledge, level of cooperation, and the placement and access of a given source. Screening operations can also assist in the determination of which discipline or agency can best conduct the exploitation. Chapter 6 discusses screening in detail. Screening operations include but are not limited to­

Mobile and static checkpoint screening, including screening of refugees and DPs.

Locally employed personnel screening.

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Screening as part of a cordon and search operation.

EPW and detainee screening.

1-20. Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. Some examples of interrogation sources include EPWs and other detainees. Interrogation sources range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic. Interrogations may be conducted at all echelons in 'all operational environments. Detainee interrogation operations conducted at a Military Police (MP) facility, coalition-operated facility, or other agency-operated collection facility are more robust and require greater planning, but have greater logistical support. Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel trained and certified in the interrogation methodology, including personnel in MOSs 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DOD policy. Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the Law of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the HUMINT collector is operating.
1-21. Debriefing is the process of questioning cooperating human sources to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source usually is not in custody and usually is willing to cooperate. Debriefing may be conducted at all echelons and in all operational environments. The primary categories of sources for debriefing are refugees, emigres, DPs, and local civilians; and friendly forces.

Refugees, Emigres, DPs, and Local Civilians Debriefing Operations. Refugee, emigre, and DP debriefing operations are the process of questioning cooperating refugees and emigres to satisfy intelligence requirements. The refugee mayor may not be in custody, and a refugee or emigre's willingness to cooperate need not be immediate or constant. Refugee debriefings are usually conducted at refugee collection points or checkpoints and may be conducted in coordination with civil affairs (CA) or MP operations. Local civilian debriefing operations are the process of questioning cooperating local civilians to satisfy intelligence requirements. As with refugees and emigres, the local civilians being debriefed mayor may not be in custody and the civilian's willingness to cooperate may not be immediate or constant. Debriefing operations must be conducted consistent with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.

Friendly Force Debriefing Operations. Friendly force debriefing operations are the systematic debriefing of US forces to answer

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collection requirements. These operations must be coordinated with US units. (See Chapter 6.)
1-22. Liaison operations are programs to coordinate activities and exchange information with host country and allied military and civilian agencies and NGOs.
1-23. Human SCO are operations directed toward the establishment of human sources who have agreed to meet and cooperate with HUMINT collectors for the purpose of providing information. Within the Army, SCO are conducted by trained personnel under the direction of military commanders. The entire range of HUMINT collection operations can be employed. SCO sources include one-time contacts, continuous contacts, and formal contacts from debriefings, liaison, and contact operations. SCO consist of collection activities that utilize human sources to identify attitude, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, target development, personnel, and capabilities of those elements that pose a potential or actual threat to US and coalition forces. SCO are also employed to develop local source or informant networks that provide early warning of imminent danger to US and coalition forces and contribute to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). See Chapter 5 for discussion of approval, coordination, and review for each type of activity.
1-24. DOCEX operations are the systematic extraction of information from open, closed, published, and electronic source documents. These documents may include documents or data inside electronic communications equipment, including computers, telephones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and Global Positioning System (GPS) terminals. This operation is not solely a HUMINT function, but may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with appropriate language support.
1-25. Many CEDs are associated with EPWs and other human sources. Consequently, a HUMINT collector is often the first person to screen them. HUMINT collectors will screen the documents associated with human sources and will extract information of use to them in their immediate collection operation. Any information discovered during this initial screening that might cross-cue another collection effort will be forwarded to the appropriate unit.
1-26. A captured document is usually something that the enemy has written for his own use. For this reason, captured documents are usually truthful and accurate. There are cases in which falsified documents have been permitted to fall into enemy hands as a means of deception but these cases are not the norm. Normal policy of not relying on single-source information should help prevent deceptions of this type from being effective. Documents also do not forget or misinterpret information although it must be remembered that their authors may have. Usually, each document provides a portion of a
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larger body of information. Each captured document, much like a single piece of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to tactical intelligence, technical data and political indicators that are important to strategic and national level agencies can sometimes be extracted from captured documents. Captured documents, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive; therefore, they are to be quickly screened for possible exploitation.
1-27. CEE includes all types of foreign and non-foreign materiel found on a detainee or on the battlefield that may have a military application or answer a collection requirement. The capturing unit must­
• Recognize certain CEE as having immediate intelligence value, and immediately forward such CEE to the unit's S2. Such items include­

All electronic communications equipment with a memory card, including computers, telephones, PDAs, and GPS terminals.

All video or photographic equipment.

Recognize certain CEE as having technical intelligence (TECHINT) value. Such items include­

New weapons.

• All communications equipment not immediately exploitable for HUMINT value.

Track vehicles.

Equipment manuals.

• All CEE known or believed to be of TECHINT interest.

Evacuate the equipment with the detainee.

Confiscate, tag, and evacuate weapons and other equipment found on the detainee the same as CEDs. (See Appendix D.)

Secure and report the capture of TECHINT items to the unit's S2 for disposition instructions.

1-28. HUMINT collection is a science and an art. Although many HUMINT collection skills may be taught, the development of a skilled HUMINT collector requires experience in dealing with people in all conditions and under all circumstances. Although there are many intangibles in the definition of a "good" HUMINT collector, certain character traits are invaluable:
• Alertness. The HUMINT collector must be alert on several levels while conducting HUMINT collection. He must concentrate on the information being provided by the source and be constantly evaluating the information for both value and veracity based on collection requirements, current intelligence, and other information obtained from the source. Simultaneously, he must be alert not only to what the source says but also to how it is said and the accompanying body language to assess the source's truthfulness, degree of cooperation, and current mood. He needs to know when to give the source a break and
6 September 2006
when to press the source harder. In addition, the HUMINT collector
constantly must be alert to his environment to ensure his personal
security and that of his source.

Patience and Tact. The HUMINT collector must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby enhancing the success of the questioning. Displaying impatience may­

Encourage a difficult source to think that if he remains unresponsive for a little longer, the HUMINT collector will stop questioning.

Cause the source to lose respect for the HUMINT collector, thereby reducing the HUMINT collector's effectiveness.

Credibility. The HUMINT collector must provide a clear, accurate, and professional product and an accurate assessment of his capabilities. He must be able to clearly articulate complex situations and concepts. The HUMINT collector must also maintain credibility with his source. He must present himself in a believable and consistent manner, and follow through on any promises made as well as never to promise what cannot be delivered.

Objectivity and Self-control. The HUMINT collector must also be totally objective in evaluating the information obtained. The HUMINT collector must maintain an objective and dispassionate attitude regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience or simulate during a questioning session. Without objectivity, he may unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable to vary his questioning and approach techniques effectively. He must have eJj:ceptional self-control to avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation, sympathy, or weariness that may cause him to lose the initiative during questioning but be able to fake any of these emotions as necessary. He must not become emotionally involved with the source.

Adaptability. A HUMINT collector must adapt to the many and varied personalities which he will encounter. He must also adapt to all types of locations, operational tempos, and operational environments. He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being adaptable, he can smoothly shift his questioning and approach techniques according to the operational environment and the personality of the source.

Perseverance. A tenacity of purpose can be the difference between a HUMINT collector who is merely good and one who is superior. A HUMINT collector who becomes easily discouraged by opposition, non­cooperation, or other difficulties will not aggressively pursue the objective to a successful conclusion or exploit leads to other valuable information.

Appearance and Demeanor. The HUMINT collector's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of any HUMINT collection operation and attitude of the source toward the HUMINT collector. Usually an organized and professional appearance will favorably influence the source. If the HUMINT collector's manner

6 September 2006
reflects fairness,strength, and efficiency, the source may prove more cooperative and more receptive to questioning.
• Initiative. Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential to a successful questioning session just as the offensive is the key to success in combat operations. The HUMINT collector must grasp the initiative and maintain it throughout all questioning phases. This does not mean he has to dominate the source physically; rather, it means that the HUMINT collector knows his requirements and continues to direct the collection toward those requirements.
1-29. The HUMINT collector must be knowledgeable in a variety of areas in
order to question sources effectively. The collector must prepare himself for
operations in a particular theater or area of intelligence responsibility
(AOIR) by conducting research. The G2 can be a valuable source of
information for this preparatory research. The HUMINT collector should
consult with order of battle (OB) technicians and analysts and collect
information from open sources and from the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) to enhance his knowledge of the AOIR. Some of these
areas of required knowledge are­

The area of operations (AO) including the social, political, and economic institutions; geography; history; language; and culture of the target area. Collectors must be aware of all ethnic, social, religious, political, criminal, tribal, and economic groups and the interrelationships between these groups.

All current and potential threat forces within the AOIR and their organization, equipment, motivation, capabilities, limitations, and normal operational methodology.

Applicable law and policy that might affect HUMINT collection activities. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. HUMINT collectors are subject to applicable law, which includes US law, the law of war (including the Geneva Conventions as applicable), and relevant international law. Additionally, local agreements with HNs or allies and the applicable execute orders and rules of engagement (ROE) may further restrict HUMINT collection activities. However, these documents cannot permit interrogation actions that would be illegal under applicable US or international law.

The collection requirements, including all specific information requirements (SIRs) and indicators that will lead to the answering of the intelligence requirements.

Cultural awareness in the various AOs will have different social and regional considerations that affect communications and can affect the conduct of operations. These may include social taboos, desired behaviors, customs, and courtesies. The staff must include this information in pre-deployment training at all levels to ensure that personnel are properly equipped to interact with the local populace.

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1-30. There are other areas of knowledge that help to develop more effective questioning:

Proficiency in the target language. The HUMINT collector can normally use an interpreter (see Chapter 11) and machine translation as they are developed to conduct questioning. Language proficiency is a benefit to the HUMINT collector in a number of ways: He can save time in questioning, be more aware of nuances in the language that might verify or deny truthfulness, and better control and evaluate interpreters.

Understanding basic human behavior. A HUMINT collector can best adapt himself to the source's personality and control of the source's reactions when he understands basic behavioral factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions. He must not only understand basic behavioral principles but also know how these principles are manifested in the area and culture in which he is operating.

Neurolinguistics. Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communication model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The HUMINT collector should read and react to nonverbal communications. He must be aware of the specific neurolinguistic clues of the cultural framework in which he is operating.

CAPABILITIES 1-31. HUMINT collection capabilities include-the ability to­

Collect information and cross-cue from an almost endless variety of potential sources including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and source-related documents.

Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other means. This includes information on threat intentions and local civilian and threat force attitudes and morale. It also includes building interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due to restrictive terrain.

Corroborate or refute information collected from other R&S assets.

Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely information ifdeployed forward in support of maneuver elements.

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1-32. HUMINT collection limitations include­

Interpersonal abilities. HUMINT is dependent on the subjective interpersonal capabilities of the individual rather than on the abilities to operate collection equipment. HUMINT collection capability is based on experience within a specific AO that can only be developed over time.

Identification of knowledgeable sources. There is often a multitude of potential HUMINT sources. Information in to specific requirements can only be collected if sources are available and identified that have that information.

Limited numbers. There are never enough HUMINT collectors to meet all requirements. Limited assets must be prioritized in support of units and operations based on their criticality.

Time limitations. HUMINT collection, particularly source operations, takes time to develop. Collection requirements must be developed with sufficient lead-time for collection.

Language limitations. Although HUMINT collectors can normally use an interpreter, a lack of language proficiency by the collector can significantly slow collection efforts. Such language proficiency takes time to develop.

Misunderstanding of the HUMINT mission. HUMINT collectors are frequently used incorrectly and assigned missions that belong to CA, MP, interpreter or translators, CI, or other operational specialties.

Commanders' risk management. Maneuver commanders, in weighing the risks associated with employing HUMINT collection teams (HCTs), should seriously consider the potential loss of a wealth of information such as enemy activities, locations of high-value personnel, and threats to the force that they will incur if they restrict HCT collection activities. J/G2Xs, operational management teams (OMTs), and HCT leaders must educate maneuver commanders on the benefits of providing security for HCTs and employing them in accordance with their capabilities.

Legal obligations. Applicable law and policy govern HUMINT collection operations. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. HUMINT operations may be further restricted by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and other agreements, execute orders and ROE, local laws, and an operational umbrella concept. Such documents, however, cannot permit interrogation actions that are illegal under applicable law.

Connectivity and bandwidth requirements. With the exception of the size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE) report, most HUMINT reporting requires considerable bandwidth. Deployed

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HUMINT teams must be able to travel to, and report from, all areas of the battlefield. Digital communication equipment must be able to provide reliable connectivity with teams' reporting channels and sufficient bandwidth for transmission of reports, including digital imagery.
• Timely reporting and immediate access to sources. Except in tactical situations when HUMINT collectors are in immediate support of maneuver units, HUMINT collection and reporting takes time. In stability and reconstruction operations, sources need to be assessed and developed. Once they are developed, they need to be contacted which often takes time and coordination. In offensive and defensive operations, HUMINT collection at detainee holding areas sometimes may still be timely enough to meet tactical and operational requirements. See paragraphs 3-2 and 3-7 for more information on offensive and defensive operations.
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FM 2-22.3
Chapter 2
Human Intelligence Structure
2-1. The success of the HUMINT collection effort depends on a complex interrelationship between command and control (C2) elements, requirements, technical control and support, and collection assets. Each echelon of command has its supporting HUMINT elements although no MI organization in the Army is robust enough to conduct sustained HUMINT operations under all operational environments using only its organic HUMINT assets. HUMINT units have specific support requirements to the commander. HUMINT units must be flexible, versatile, and prepared to conduct HUMINT collection and analysis operations in support of any echelon of command. A coherent C2 structure within these HUMINT organizations is necessary in order to ensure successful, disciplined, and legal HUMINT operations. This structure must include experienced commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs conscientiously discharging their responsibilities and providing HUMINT collectors with guidance from higher headquarters.
2-2. Regardless of the echelon, there are four basic elements that work together to provide the deployed commander with well-focused, thoroughly planned HUMINT support. The four elements are staff support, analysis, C2, and collection. Each piece of the infrastructure builds on the next and is based on the size, complexity, and type of operation as shown in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. Tactical HUMINT Organization.
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2-3. HUMINT control organizations are the means by which a commander exercises command of a unit's operations. HUMINT control organizations are vital to "the effective use of HUMINT collection assets. HUMINT control organizations consist of the C/J/G/S2X and the HUMINT operations cell (HOC) at the brigade and above level and the OMTs at the battalion and below level.
2-4. The C/J/G/S2X is a staff element subordinate to the 'C/J/G/S2, is the primary advisor on HUMINT and CI, and is the focal point for all HUMINT and CI activities within a joint task force (JTF) (J2X), an Army component task force (G2X) or a brigade combat team (BCT) (S2X). The 2X can be organic to the unit staff or can be attached or under operational control (OPCON) to the staff from another organization such as the theater MI brigade. The C/J/G/S2X is part of a coherent architecture that includes organic HUMINT assets and HUMINT resources from national, theater, and non-DOD HUMINT organizations.
2-5. The C/J2X is responsible for controlling Joint Force HUMINT assets, coordinating all HUMINT and CI collection activities, and keeping the joint force C/J/2 informed on all HUMINT and CI activities conducted in the joint force area of responsibility (AOR). The C/J2X is also part of the review and recommendation process concerned with the retention or release of detainees. HUMINT reports maintained at the C/J2X are considered during the review for release process. The C/J2X consists of the 2X Officer, a HOC, a Counterintelligence Coordination Authority (CICA), a HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC), and a CI Analysis Cell (CIAC). At all echelons, the 2X should also include an Operational Support Cell (OSC) staffed to operate 24 hours a day. The authority and operational responsibilities of a C/J2X in combined or joint contingency operations (CONOP) takes precedence over service-specific CI and HUMINT technical control agencies. Specifically, the C/J/G/S2X­
• Accomplishes technical control and support, and deconfliction of all HUMINT and CI assets through the Army component G2X, the HUMINT and CI operations sections, or the OMTs.

Participates in planning for deployment of HUMINT and CI assets in support of operations.

Coordinates, through the HOC and the CICA, all HUMINT and CI activities to support intelligence collection and the intelligence aspects of force protection for the deployed commander.

Coordinates and deconflicts all HUMINT and CI operations within the operational area.

Coordinates with the senior US national intelligence representative for specific operational approval when required by standing agreements.

Is the release authority for HUMINT reporting at his echelon and only releases reports to the all-source system after ensuring all technical control measures for reporting have been met.

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______________________________FM 2-22.3

Coordinates with other HUMINT collection agencies not under the control of the command, such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Does not exercise OPCON over HUMINT and CI assets assigned, attached, or reinforcing the unit; however, he is the staff support responsible for creating a cohesive HUMINT and CI effort.

Coordinates with non-DOD agencies conducting HUMINT collection operations in the joint area of operations (JAO) to ensure deconfliction of sources, informants, or contacts and the HUMINT reporting that is generated by these collection operations.

2-6. The J2X will maintain technical control (see para 4-10) of all CI investigative actions within its AOIR; however, all investigative matters will be in accordance with DOD policies, joint or Military Department doctrine, applicable US law and policy, SOFAs, or other International Standardization Agreements (ISAs). The J2X will advise the responsible Theater CICA (TCICA) of any Army CI element conducting investigative activities that fall under the purview of AR 381-20.
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CELL (OSC) 2-7. The OSC in the C/J/G/S2X staff will maintain the consolidated source registry for all HUMINT and CI activities in. the unit's designated AOIR. The OSC will provide management of intelligence property book operations, source incentive programs, and intelligence contingency funds (lCFs) for subordinate HUMINT and CI elements. The OSC responsibilities also include requests for information (RFIs) and/or source-directed requirements (SDRs) management and the release of intelligence information reports (I1Rs).
2-8. The CICA is assigned under the J/G2X and coordinates all CI activities within its designated AOIR. (See FM 34-60 for a detailed explanation of the CI mission.) The CICA­

Provides technical support to all CI assets and coordinates and deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AOIR.

Coordinates and supervises CI investigations and collection activities conducted by all services and components in the AOIR.

Establishes and maintains the theater CI source database.

Coordinates with the HOC for CI support to detention, interrogation, refugee, and other facilities.

Manages requirements and taskings for CI collectors in the AO in coordination with the HOC.

Expedites preparation of .CI reports and their distribution to consumers at all levels.

Coordinates CI activities with senior CI officers from all CI organizations on the battlefield.

6 September 2006 2-3

Performs liaison with HN and US national level CI organizations.

Informs the appropriate TCICA .when Army CI. elements are conducting CI investigative activities within the purview ofAR 381-20.

2-9. The HOC is assigned under the J/G2X to track all HUMINT activities in the AOIR. The J/G2X uses this information to advise the senior intelligence officer (SIO) on all HUMINT activities conducted within the AOIR. The HOC­

Provides technical support to all HUMINT collection' operations and deconflicts HUMINT collection operations in the designated AOIR.

Establishes and maintains a consolidated HUMINT source database in coordination with the CICA.

Coordinates with collection managers and the HAC to identify collection requirements and to ensure requirements are met.

Coordinates the activities of HUMINT collectors assigned or attached to interrogation, debriefing, refugee, DOCEX, and other facilities.

Manages requirements and taskings for HUMINT collectors in the AOIR, in coordination with the CICA.

Expedites preparation of intelligence reports and their distribution to consumers at all levels.

Performs liaison with HN and US national HUMINT organizations.

2-10. A HUMINT OMT consists of senior individuals in MOS 351M (351E) and MOS 97E. Each OMT can control 2 to 4 HCTs depending upon assigned mission and operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The OMT performs a necessary function when two or more HCTs deploy by assisting the HUMINT element commander in tasking and providing technical support to assigned or attached HCTs. The OMT is optimally collocated with the command post (CP) of the supported unit. However, it must be located where it can provide oversight of team operations and best support the dissemination of tasking, reports, and technical data between the unit and the deployed collection assets. When a higher echelon augments subordinate elements with collection teams, it should include proportional OMT augmentation. When a single collection team is attached in direct support (DS) of a subordinate element, the senior team member exerts mission and technical control over the team. The OMT­

Provides operational and technical control and guidance to deployed HCTs.

Normally consists of a WO and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) whose experience and knowledge provide the necessary guidance for effective team collection operations.

Manages the use of ICFs and incentives for the HCTs.

Provides the collection focus for HCTs.

6 September 2006

Provides quality control and dissemination of reports for subordinate HCTs.

Directs the activities of subordinate HCTs and controls their operations.

Conducts limited single-discipline HUMINT analysis and mission analysis for the supported commander.

• Acts as a conduit between subordinate HCTs, the HOC, and the C/J/G/S2X.
• Reports the HCT mission and equipment status to the HOC and the command element.
2-11. HCTs are the elements that collect information from human sources. The HUMINT collectors deploy in teams of approximately four personnel in MaS 97E (HUMINT Collector) and MaS 351M (351E) (HUMINT Technician).
2-12. The HCT may be augmented based on factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Interpreters from the RC or civilian contractors with appropriate security clearances are added when necessary. TECHINT personnel or other specific subject-matter experts (SMEs) may augment the team to meet technical collection requirements. Another example would be pairing HUMINT collectors with dedicated analysts to provide sharper focus to the interrogation effort. In fixed detention facilities, these HUMINT collector or analyst relationships may become more enduring. Commanders are not encouraged to mix HUMINT collectors and CI agents on a single team. Doing so seriously undermines the ability to conduct both the HUMINT collection and CI missions simultaneously. However, commanders may find times when METT-TC factors make it reasonable to augment a CI team with HUMINT support for a mission, or vice versa.
2-13. A command debriefing team is normally not a table of organization and equipment (TOE) organization but may be task organized to meet mission requirements. This task-organized team is normally OPCON to the HOC. Although more prevalent during stability and reconstruction operations, senior personnel will often acquire information of intelligence interest during the normal course of their duties. The HUMINT collection assets, particularly at division echelon or higher, will normally task organize a team of more senior, experienced individuals to debrief these senior unit personnel. In offensive and defensive operations, this same team is prepared to interrogate high-value detainees (including EPWs) or debrief senior civilians. The command debriefing team should not be confused with the G2/S2 debriefing program, which also is critical and is an important conduit of information.
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2-14. DOCEX teams are normally found at theater and national level organizations. Lower echelon HCTs may also be designated to perform the DOCEX mission based upon mission parameters and linguist availability. However, if organic assets are used, there will be a mission tradeoff. Dependent on the priority of exploitation and volume of documents, HCTs assigned the DOCEX mission may be augmented by military, civilian, or contractor personnel to accomplish their assigned mission. During operations, the DOCEX team will normally screen documents, extract information, and expedite the evacuation of documents to the Joint or Theater Document Exploitation Facility.
HUMINT ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS 2-15. HUMINT analysis and production organizations analyze information collected from HUMINT sources; support the requirements management (RM) system, and produce single-discipline intelligence products. HUMINT analysis and production are conducted at all echelons, separate brigades, and higher. (See Chapter 12 for a description of the HUMINT analysis system and methodologies.)
2-16. The HAC is part of the J/G2X; however, it may be collocated with an analysis and control element (ACE) or Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) single-source enclave depending on facilities and operational environment considerations. The HAC works closely with the all-source intelligence elements and the CIAC to ensure that HUMINT reporting is incorporated into the all-source analysis and common operational picture (COP). The HAC is the "fusion point" for all HUMINT reporting and operational analysis in the JISE and ACE. It determines gaps in reporting and coordinates with the RM to cross-cue other intelligence sensor systems. The HAC-­

Produces and disseminates HUMINT products and provides input to intelligence summaries (lNTSUMs).

Uses analytical tools found at the ACE or JISE to develop long-term analyses and provides reporting feedback that supports the HOC, OMTs, and HCTs.

Provides analytical expertise to the C/J/G/S2X, HOC, and OMTs.

Produces country and regional studies tailored to HUMINT collection.

Compiles target folders to assist C/J/G/S2X assets in focusing collection efforts.

Analyzes and reports on trends and patterns found in HUMINT reporting.

Analyzes source reliability and credibility as reflected in reporting and communicates that analysis to the collector.

Develops and maintains databases specific to HUMINT collection activities.

Produces HUMINT requirements.

Answers HUMINT-related RFIs.

Identifies collection gaps and provides context for better collection at their echelon.

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_______________________________FM 2-22.3
JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER ANALYSIS SECTION 2-17. This section ensures that all members of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) (see para 5-102) are aware of the current situation through the distribution of INTSUMs and products from external agencies. The Analysis Section also supports the JIDC by­

Providing situation update briefings to all facility personnel every 12 hours.

Preparing research and background packets and briefings for interrogations and debriefings.

Developing indicators for each intelligence requirement to support screening operations.

Conducting single-discipline HUMINT analysis based on collected information to support further collection efforts.

Correlating reports produced by the JIDC to facilitate analysis at higher levels.

Answering RFIs from interrogators and formulating RFIs that cannot be answered by the analytical section on behalf of the interrogators.

Reviewing IIRs and extracting information into analysis tools tailored to support the interrogation process.

Pursuing products and resources to support the interrogation effort.

HUMINT ANALYSIS TEAM 2-18. The HUMINT analysis team (HAT) is subordinate to the G2 ACE. The HAT supports the G2 in the development of IPB products and in developing and tailoring SIRs to match HUMINT collection capabilities.
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FM 2-22.3
Chapter 3
HUMINT in Support of Army Operations
3-1. Army doctrine for full spectrum operations recognizes four types of military operations: offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and civil support. Missions in any environment require the Army to conduct or be prepared to conduct any combination of these operations. HUMINT assets will be called on to provide information in support of all four operations. Simultaneous operations, for example elements of a force conducting offensive operations while other elements are engaged in stability and reconstruction operations, will cause a similar division of the limited HUMINT assets based on METT-TC.
3-2. Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy. Rapid maneuver, constantly changing situations, and a vital need for intelligence support at the point of contact influence HUMINT missions during offensive operations. The guiding principle to the use of HUMINT in support of offensive operations is to minimize the time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, and local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them.
3-3. During offensive operations, at echelons corps and below, HCTs normally operate in the engaged maneuver brigades' AOs and are further deployed in support of maneuver battalions based on advice from the OMTs. These collection assets may be in general support (GS) of the parent brigade or in DS of the maneuver battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, and other forward-deployed maneuver assets. The HCTs and their supporting control structure are deployed in accordance with METT-TC based on three principles:

The relative importance of that subordinate element's operations to the overall parent unit's scheme of maneuver and the overall ISR plan.

The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees, media and materiel, or to encounter civilians on the battlefield.

The criticality of information that could be obtained from those sources to the success of the parent unit's overall OPLANs.

3-4. HUMINT missions in support of offensive operations include screening and interrogating EPWs and other detainees, questioning and debriefing civilians in the supported unit's AO, and conducting DOCEX, limited to extracting information of immediate tactical value. EAC assets normally support offensive operations through theater interrogation and debriefing facility operations and mobile interrogation teams. These facilities are better equipped to conduct in-depth interrogations and DOCEX, so it is imperative
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that EPWs and other detainees who will be evacuated to theater facilities be transported there as soon as possible.
3-5. Forced entry operations (FEOs) are offensive operations conducted to establish an initial military presence in a target area in the face of expected enemy opposition. HUMINT collection assets may be able to provide vital information to tactical commanders in the critical early stages of the entry operation. Key considerations for HUMINT support to FEOs include:

HUMINT collectors attached or under OPCON of the initial force package to provide HUMINT collection support for the entry force. Collection teams will normally operate in support of battalion-sized or smaller elements. HUMINT collection assets should be integrated early and should participate in all aspects of planning and training, including rehearsals, to smoothly integrate and execute operations.

HUMINT assets supporting the entry force must include proportional OMT elements. For example, if 2 to 4 teams are attached to a maneuver brigade, an OMT also needs to be attached. Even if the teams are further attached to maneuver battalions, there must be an OMT at the brigade level to coordinate and control HUMINT collection activities.

HCTs and OMTs must be as mobile and as survivable as the entry forces. Team leaders should ensure that the supported unit will be able to provide maintenance support to the team vehicles, as appropriate, in accordance with the support relationship.

Attached or OPCON HUMINT teams must have robust communications connectivity with the supported unit and must have reach connectivity through their OMT.

HCTs must contain organic or attached language capability in order to conduct HUMINT collection effectively during FEO. It is unlikely that the teams can be augmented with attached civilian interpreters during this type of operation.

3-6. Early entry operations differ from FEOs in that early entry operations do not anticipate large-scale armed opposition. Early entry operations establish or enhance US presence, stabilize the situation, and shape the environment for follow-on forces. HUMINT collection provides critical support to defining the operational environment and assessing the threat to US forces. The considerations listed above for FEOs apply equally to early entry operations.
3-7. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize
forces, hold the enemy in one area while attacking in another, or develop
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Forces conducting defensive
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FM 2-22.3
operations must be able to identify rapidly the enemy's main effort and rapidly assess the operational conditions to determine the timing of counter­offensive or other operations. HUMINT support to defensive operations centers on the ability to provide the forward-deployed maneuver commander with information and intelligence of immediate tactical value. HUMINT assets should be placed in the AO of the forward elements to minimize the time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them. HUMINT collectors are placed where the potential for HUMINT collection and the criticality of the information are greatest.
3-8. In defensive operations, it may be necessary to divide the HUMINT assets equally among the subordinate elements to provide area coverage until the primary enemy threat is identified. The HUMINT C2 elements (team leader, OMTs, and unit C2) must be prepared to task organize rapidly and shift resources as the situation dictates, based on the changing situation and higher headquarters FRAGO. HUMINT missions in defensive operations normally include interrogation of detainees, refugee debriefings, and assisting in friendly force patrol debriefings.
3-9. Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military and civilian capabilities to help establish order that advances US interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long­term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and robust civil society. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. The primary focus of the HCTs during stability and reconstruction operations is to answer the commander's information requirements (IRs) and provide support to force protection. In stability and reconstruction operations, the HUMINT collectors must be able to maintain daily contact with the local population. The nature of the threat in stability operations can range from conventional forces· to terrorists and organized crime and civil disturbances. Consequently, intelligence requirements can vary greatly. Examples of HUMINT collection requirements include TECHINT to support arms control; extensive political information and demographic data; order of battle (OB) regarding several different former warring factions during peace operations; or extremely detailed target data. HUMINT collectors also help to ascertain the feelings, attitudes, and activities of the local populace. Stability and reconstruction operations may be conducted in coordination with other US departments and agencies, and in conjunction with other countries and international organizations.
3-10. Centralized management and databasing are key to successful
HUMINT operations. The HUMINT assets may operate in GS to the parent
unit or operate in the AO of subordinate elements of the parent unit. For
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example, in a division AO, the HCTs would normally operate in DS to the division but each team would normally have an AOIR that corresponds to the AO of the division's brigades or battalion task forces.· There is close coordination between the HUMINT staff officer (C/J/G/S2X) and the OMTs to synchronize HUMINT operations properly, to develop the overall threat awareness, and to deconflict sources. The HCTs screen and debrief contacts to increase the security posture of US forces, to provide information in response to command collection requirements, and to provide early warning of threats to US forces. They may also interrogate detainees if permitted to do so by the mission-specific orders and in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
3-11. Many stability and reconstruction operations are initiated with the establishment of a lodgment or base area. There is a subsequent expansion of operations to encompass the entire AO. The general concept of an HCT's operation is that of a two-phased effort. In the initial phase, the HCT establishes concentric rings of operations around the US forces starting from the supported unit's base of operations and working outward. Each ring is based on the threat environment and the commander's need to develop his knowledge of the tactical situation. The second, or continuation phase, begins once the initial information collection ring is established. The initial ring is not abandoned but rather is added to as the HCT shifts its focus to expand and establish the second and successive rings. The amount of time spent establishing each ring is situationally dependent.
3-12. The initial phase of stability and reconstruction operations is used to lay the foundation for future team operations. In general, the priority of effort is focused inward on security. The HCT conducts initial and follow-up screenings of locally employed personnel, to establish base data for subsequent source operations. The supported unit S2, with the assistance of the HUMINT team leader, establishes procedures to debrief reconnaissance and surveillance assets operating in the supported unit AO, as well as regular combat patrols or logistics convoys. The HCT lays the groundwork for future collection efforts by establishing liaison with local authorities, as well as developing plans and profiles for HUMINT collection. While establishing the initial and subsequent rings, the HCT actively seeks to collect PIR information, whether it pertains to the current ring or any other geographic location.
3-13. Following the initial phase, the HCT's focus shifts outward. While the HCT continues performing HUMINT collection and analysis functions within the base camp, it also expands its collection effort to outside the base camp to answer the supported unit's requirements. During the continuation phase, the HCT conducts contact operations with local personnel who may be able to
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FM 2-22.3
provide information of interest to the local commander or to satisfy the requirements of the tasking or request. The RCT also conducts liaison with local authorities, coalition forces (if present), NGOs, and others whose knowledge or activities may affect the success of the US mission. Any time the RCT is outside the base camp, it must be careful to observe the local population and report what it sees. The activities and attitudes of the general population will often have an effect on the commander's decisions on how to conduct US missions in the area.
LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT 3-14. RCTs may be employed with varying degrees of contact with the local population. As the degree of contact with the population increases, the quantity and diversity of RUMINT collection increases. In many instances, however, there is a risk to the RCT inherent with increased exposure to the local population. The ability of the RCT members to fit in with the local populace can become very important to their safety. Consequently, the commander should consider exceptions to the ROE, as well as relaxed grooming and uniform standards, to help RCT members blend in and provide additional security. Commanders must consider the culture in which the RCT members will be operating. In some cultures, bearded men are more highly respected than clean-shaven men. Relaxing grooming standards for RCTs in these situations will support the team's ability to collect information. The decision regarding what level to employ an RCT is METT­TC dependent. The risk to the collection assets must be balanced with the need to collect information and to protect the force as a whole. The deployment and use of RUMINT collection assets may be limited by legal restrictions, mission-specific orders, directions from higher headquarters, and the overall threat level. The four basic levels of employment for the RCT are discussed below. Figure 3-1 shows these levels as well as their collection potential versus team security.
Base Camp .• Restricting the RCT to operations within the base camp minimizes the risk to the team. This action, however, minimizes the collection potential and maximizes the risk to the force as a whole. While restricted to a base camp, the RCT can maintain an extremely limited level of information collection by­
• Interviewing walk-in sources and locally employed personnel.
• Debriefing combat and ISR patrols.

Conducting limited local open-source information collection.

This mode of deployment should be used only when dictated by operational restrictions. These would be at the initial stages of stability and reconstruction operations when the operational environment is being assessed, or as a temporary expedient when the force protection level exceeds the ability to provide reasonable protection for the collectors. A supported unit commander is often tempted to keep the RCT "inside the wire" when the force protection ·level or threat

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condition (THREATCON) level increases. The supported unit and parent commanders must compare the gains of the HCT collection effort with the risks posed. This is necessary especially during high THREATCON levels when the supported unit commander needs as complete a picture as possible of the threat arrayed against US or multinational forces.
Figure 3-1. Team Level of Employment.

Integrated with Other Operations

Under some circumstances, when it is not expedient to deploy the HCT independently due to threat levels or other restrictions, it can be integrated into other ongoing operations. The HCT may be employed as part of a combat patrol, ISR patrol, or in support of an MP patrol or stationed at a checkpoint or roadblock. It can also be used to support CA, psychological operations (PSYOP), engineer, or other operations. This method reduces the risk to the team while greatly increasing its collection potential over the confined-to-base-camp method. It has the advantage of placing the team in contact with the local population and allowing it to spot, assess, and interact with potential sources of information.

The integration into other operations can also facilitate the elicitation of information. However, this deployment method restricts collection by subordinating the team's efforts to the requirements, locations, and timetables of the unit or operation into which it is integrated. Integration can be done at the team or individual collector level. HUMINT collectors should be used only in situations with an

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intelligence collection potential. It is a waste of a valuable asset to use them in a function that could be performed by a civilian translator.
As an Independent Patrol

Defensive. One of the key elements of the RCT success is the opportunity to spot, assess, and develop relationships with potential sources of information. Operating as independent patrols, without being tied to ISR or combat assets, enables the RCTs maximum interaction with the local population, thereby maximizing the pool of potential sources of information. The RCT must be integrated into the supported unit's ISR plan and be provided with other command elements as needed to support the collection mission. The team leader will advise the supported unit on the specific capabilities and requirements of the team to maximize mission success. This method also increases the risk to the team. RCT members must carry the necessary firepower for self-protection. They must also have adequate communications equipment to call for help if needed. The team's posture, equipment, and appearance will be dictated by overall force restrictions and posture. When operating as an independent patrol, the RCT should not stand out from overall US forces operations. If US forces are in battle-dress uniforms and operating out of military vehicles, so should the RUMINT collectors.

Soft. If the threat situation is such that soldiers are authorized to wear civilian clothes when outside base areas, the RUMINT collectors should also move among the civilian population in civilian clothes, so that they do not stand out from others in the area.

CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS 3-15. Army support supplements the efforts and resources of state and local governments and organizations. If a presidential declaration initiates civil support for a major disaster or emergency, involvement of DOD intelligence components would be by exception. Civil support requires extensive coordination and liaison among many organizations-interagency, joint, AC, and RC-as well as with state and local governments, and in any case will require compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C., § 1385, when US forces are employed to assist Federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The National Response Plan provides a national level architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting agencies.
3-16. Units are often task organized with additional ISR units and assets to
meet the detailed collection requirements in the urban operations. The
complexities ofurban terrain cause degradation in the capabilities of many of
the sensor systems. RUMINT collectors may have to be placed in DS of lower
echelon combat maneuver forces (battalion and lower) to support operations.
RUMINT and combat reporting by units in direct contact with threat forces
and local inhabitants becomes the means of collection. For successful ISR
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planning, the S2 must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the various organic and attached collection systems as they apply to urban operations. As in .all environments, commanders must assess the risk involved in the forward deployment of HUMINT assets.
3-17. In urban operations, people (for example, detainees and civilians) are the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides information not otherwise available through signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) such as threat and local population intentions. They collect information on, for example, floor plans, defensive plans, locations of combatants and noncombatants, includin&, civilians in the buildings and surrounding neighborhoods, and other iriformation. The collected information is passed directly to the individuals conducting the combat operation.
3-18. In small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and· in peacetime military engagements (PMEs), contact with local officials and populace by the HUMINT collectors can be a prime source of information about the local environment and is a vital component of intelligence support to force protection. During routine patrolling of urban areas it is often expedient to place a HUMINT collector with individual patrols. The key difference between urban and other operations, from major theater war (MTW) to PME, is the number of HUMINT collectors required. The need for HUMINT collectors is a function of population density. Whereas in a rural environment, a HUMINT team may be able to cover an area in excess of 1,200 square kilometers; the same team in a dense urban environment may be able to cover only 10 square blocks or less.
3-19. In a permissive environment, HCTs normally travel throughout their specific AOR as separate teams or as part of a larger reconnaissance team. HUMINT collectors may frequently make direct contact with the individual, view the activity, or visit the area that is the subject of the ISR effort. They normally use debriefing and elicitation to obtain first-hand information from local civilians and officials as their primary collection techniques. Additional information can be obtained from exploitation of open-source material such as newspapers, television, and other media. The priority requirements in this environment are normally linked to force protection. HCTs should establish liaison and casual source contacts throughout their AOIR. Reporting is normally via IIRs, although SALUTE reports are used for critical time­sensitive reporting. Even in a permissive environment, the HUMINT collector conducts the majority of his collection through the debriefing of individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the information they are reporting.
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FM 2-22.3
3·20. In a semi-permissive environment, security considerations increase, but the risk to the collector still must be weighed against the potential intelligence gain. HCTs should still be used throughout their AOIR but will normally be integrated into other ground reconnaissance operations or other planned operations. For example, a HUMINT collector may accompany a CA team or PSYOP team visiting a village. Security for the team and their sources is a prime consideration. The HCTs are careful not to establish a fixed pattern of activity and arrange contacts in a manner that could compromise the source or the collector. Debriefing and elicitation are still the primary collection techniques. Teams are frequently deployed to conduct collection at roadblocks, refugee collection points, and detainee collection points. They may conduct interrogations of EPWs and other detainees within the limits of the mission-specific orders, and applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 231O.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. DOCEX is also used to accomplish exploitation of threat documents. Reporting is normally via SALUTE report and IlR.
3-21. In a hostile environment, the three concerns for HUMINT collection are access to the sources of information, timeliness of reporting, and security for the HUMINT collectors. Prior to the entry of a force into a hostile AO, HUMINT collectors are used to debrief civilians, particularly refugees, and to interrogate EPWs and other detainees who have been in the AO. HCTs are normally located with the friendly units on the peripheries of the AO to facilitate timely collection and reporting. If a refugee or EPW/detainee population exists prior to this mission, they are screened to determine knowledgability of the AO and are debriefed or interrogated as appropriate. HUMINT collectors accompany the friendly ground reconnaissance elements as they enter the AO. As part of the ground reconnaissance force, they interrogate EPWs and other detainees and debrief refugees, displaced persons, and friendly force patrols. Reporting is normally via oral or written SALUTE reports with more detailed information reported via IlRs. They may also support the S2 through the systematic debriefing of friendly ground reconnaissance assets and the translation of any documents collected by them.
3-22. Each SCC with an outside continental United States (OCONUS) responsibility has an US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) MI brigade or group to provide operational HUMINT support to that command. These MI elements provide peacetime support to the unified
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command and add a consistent, forward-deployed presence in a particular theater of operations. Theater MI brigade and group assets provide HUMINT support during contingency operations. These HCTscan support a JTF, an army combatant command, or any deployed element that requires augmentation.
JOINT, COMBINED, AND DOD HUMINT ORGANIZATIONS 3-23. The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy have limited HUMINT collection capability. They will normally provide strategic debriefing trained and certified personnel to joint interrogation and debriefing facilities primarily to collect information on areas of particular interest to that Military Department. Within the Department of the Navy, however, the US Marine Corps has a robust tactical HUMINT collection capability that operates primarily in support of engaged Marine Corps forces. Marine expeditionary elements deploy with human exploitation teams (HETs) that provide organic HUMINT and CI support to the deployed Marine force. Marine HETs are rapidly deployable and fully equipped to conduct the full range of tactical HUMINT and CI functions. They can provide support to either the deployed Marine force or as part of JTF HUMINT or CI teams. Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has organic HETs. HETs can also be attached to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) for a particular operation.
3-24. HUMINT agencies from DOD, national level intelligence agencies, and
LEAs can support the battlefield commander. In a JTF, a national
intelligence support team (NIST) works with the J2X to coordinate national
level activities with JTF and component HUMINT and analytical assets.
Sometimes liaison officers (LNOs) are assigned directly to the C/J/2X to
facilitate collection activities.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA is a DOD combat support (CS) agency and an important member of the United States Intelligence Community. With more than 7,000 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. DIA provides military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners in DOD and the Intelligence Community in support of US military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition.

Defense HUMINT (DH) Service. The DH Service, a branch of the DIA, is the force provider for strategic HUMINT forces and capabilities. During operations, elements from DR form a partnership within the supported JTF headquarters J2X element for the coordination and deconfliction of HUMINT source-related collection activities. DH support to a joint force is outlined in the classified DIAM 58-11 and DIAM 58-12.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA supports US national security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security. The CIA

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conducts CI activities, HUMINT collection, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President. Joint Pub 2-01.2 (S//NF) contains details of CIA contributions to the deployed force.

Department of State. The State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security provides CI support to diplomatic missions worldwide and gathers extensive information on intelligence capabilities of adversaries within that diplomatic mission's area of concern. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research is the State Department's primary source for interpretive analysis of global developments. It is also the focal point in the State Department for all policy issues and activities involving the Intelligence Community.

National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA is a DOD agency that coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect US information systems and produce foreign intelligence information. It is also one of the most important centers of foreign language analysis and research within the Government.

Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS). The DCIS is the criminal investigative arm of the Inspector General (IG) of DOD. The DCIS's mission is to protect America's warfighters by initiating, conducting, and supervising investigations in support of crucial National Defense priorities.

Department of Justice:

Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI may provide the deployed commander with national level expertise on criminal and CI issues if currently operating in a task force (TF) AO and liaison is established early.

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The DEA provides counterdrug operational expertise to a deployed TF and coordinates its operations with those of a deployed TF.

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, protect the homeland, its citizens, and critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist attack. DHS provides a lead for Federal incident response, management, and recovery in the event of terrorist attack and natural disasters. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. DHS operates the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and the DHS-led Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG). The DHS AOR is the US and its territories. DHS secures and protects the entry points to the nation, the areas between the entry points, land and water, for people, and cargo or conveyances. DHS enforces immigration, customs, and transportation security laws and
regulations, counter-narcotics, counterfeiting, financial crimes, and threats to the President. As legislated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS is chartered as the primary outreach Fed'eral activity for state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. Although DHS has no direct role in support of a ''battlefield commander" outside the United States, DHS component organizations have representatives deployed in support of US Government missions in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR.

Department ofEnergy (DOE). The DOE can assist with the­

Exploitation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). '

Protection or elimination of weapons and weapons-useable (dual­use) nuclear material or infrastructure.

Redirection of excess foreign weapons expertise to civilian enterprises.

Prevention and reversal of the proliferation ofWMD.

Reduction of the risk of accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide.

The capability enhancement of WMD detection including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC).

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA is a member of the US Intelligence Community and a DOD Combat Support Agency. NGA provides timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives. Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.

Counterintelligence Field Agency (CIFA). The mission of CIFA is to develop and manage DOD CI programs and functions that support the protection of the Department. These programs and functions include CI support to protect DOD personnel, resources, critical information, research and development programs, technology, critical infrastructure, economic security, and US interests against foreign influence and manipulation, as well as to detect and neutralize espionage against the Department.

3-25. Most potential coalition partners have some type of HUMINT capability. Less developed nations may use HUMINT as their primary collection system and may be quite skilled in HUMINT operations. These assets will be present on the battlefield, and US assets are likely to work with them. HCTs should perform regular liaison with coalition HUMINT personnel. It is likely that some coalition partners will be more knowledgeable of the culture in the AO and be able to share insights with US HCTs.
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FM 2-22.3
Chapter 4
HUMINT Operations Planning and Management
4-1. HUMINT operations planning and management are supported by a robust structure that includes staff elements such as the C2X when working with non-US forces at the Joint intelligence staff level, G2X at the Division, Corps intelligence staff, the HUMINT operations section in the MI Battalion, and HAT in the Division and Corps ACE. It also includes C2 elements at the MI battalion, company, platoon, and team levels. The OMT provides the first level of staff and C2 functions when two or more HCTs deploy in support of an operation. (See Table 4-1.)
Table 4-1. HUMINT Operations.

HUMINT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 4-2. Following the operations process defined in FM 3-0, Chapter 6, there are four components within HUMINT operations: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess.
4-3. HUMINT planning defines collection objectives, when to collect it, and which resources will be tasked to do the collection. Commanders with HUMINT collection assets in their units receive collection tasking based on requirements developed during ISR planning. The commander and staff, in concert with their supporting OMTs, assess the requirements and task the team or teams best capable of answering the requirement based on contact placement and access.
4-4. Another aspect to consider carefully during the Plan phase of the operational cycle is technical control. Technical control is ensuring adherence to existing policies and regulations, providing information and guidance of a technical nature, and supervising the MaS-specific TTP required in
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conducting collection missions. Planning must take into account that technical control does not interfere with or supersede any C2 that a commander has over an asset or unit nor does it interfere with collection of the commander's requirements. For HUMINT collectors, the technical control network includes the C/J/G/S2X, the HOC, and OMTs. Technical control includes the management of source and other sensitive data and databases, the management of intelligence contingency and incentive funds, the liaison with other HUMINT organizations, and the deconfliction of operations. Technical control provides HCTs with specific requirements and data that they need to conduct operations and, in certain circumstances, specific instructions on how to execute missions.
4-5. During this phase, commanders and staff, including HUMINT management sections, review HUMINT mission plans. This review is to ensure all areas of the mission are considered and addressed in the plan and included in rehearsals. Items to cover include but are not limited to--­

Route (primary and alternate).


Security plan.

Convoy procedures including actions on contact and rally points.

Initial requirements to be covered.

Mission duration.

4~6. The HUMINT collector then researches the topic area addressing the requirement and prepares a questioning plan. The HCTs and OMTs must coordinate all mission requirements. It is important that HUMINT elements are included in all rehearsals conducted by their supported unit. These rehearsals will enable HCTs to carry out essential coordination with other units and ensure that they are included in and familiar with procedures such as resupply, communications, casualty evacuation, fire support, and fratricide avoidance. Rehearsals and briefbacks will allow the supported command to see and correct problems with their support to the HUMINT elements prior to deployment.
4-7. Mission execution consists of the collection of information in accordance with the integrated ISR plan. The requirements manager validates the requirements based on command guidance. The G3 tasks the requirements to the units and the individual asset managers (that is, OMT) to identify the assets best capable to answer the requirement. When requirements are levied against a specific HCT, the HCT leader decides which of his team's contacts can best answer the requirements. He then turns the requirement into specific team tasks.
4-8. Assessment is the continuous monitoring-throughout planning, preparation, and execution-of the current situation and progress of an
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_______________________________FM 2-22.3
operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments. Assessment plays an integral role in all aspects of the intelligence process (see FM 2-0).
4-9. Commanders of organizations that conduct HUMINT operations are responsible for task organization, mission tasking, execution, mission accomplishment, and designation of subordinate AOs (within the guidelines of the OPORD or OPLAN). MI unit commanders who exercise direct control of HUMINT operations, including interrogation operations, at all levels are responsible for and stand accountable to ensure HUMINT collection activities comply with this manual and applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The MI unit commanders must ensure mission accomplishment by properly allocating resources and logistics in support of all HUMINT collection assets assigned to their units. Commanders must ensure that their HUMINT collection personnel are trained and ready for the mission. There is a need for a partnership between the J/G2X, who exercises technical direction and oversight responsibility and the MI commander, who exercises direct command authority and responsibility. The MI unit commander analyzes the higher headquarters mission, concept of operations, and the specified and implied tasks given to his unit. He restates the unit mission, designs the concept of operations, task organizes his assets, and provides support to subordinate units. Specifically, the MI unit commandel'­

Issues mission orders with sufficient details and time for subordinate commanders and leaders to plan and lead their units.

Must know the threat, his organization, ISR systems, counter-ISR systems, operations, and terrain over which his units will operate and how that terrain enhances or limits HUMINT collection operations.

Must be aware of the operational and technical limitations of his unit and ensures that all assets are task organized, properly positioned, and fully synchronized to accomplish the mission.

Oversees the collective and individual training within his unit.

Coordinates continuously with the higher headquarters staff, the supported maneuver unit staff, and other commanders to ensure integrated R&S operations and support.

Establishes clear, consistent standards and guidance for current and future operations in order to adhere to policy and the higher headquarters commander's intent without his constant personal supervision.

Continually assesses his unit's ability to sustain its internal operations and its ability to support assigned missions and keeps the higher headquarters staff informed of unit, equipment, and personnel status that affect collection operations.

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• Advises his higher headquarters commander and staff on the capabilities, limitations, and most effective employment of his assets.

Remains flexible during operations to adjust or execute missions upon receipt of new orders and when the situation changes.

Ensures personnel are working within legal, regulatory, and policy guidelines.

4-10. Technical control refers to superVlSlon of the TTP of HUMINT collection. Technical control ensures adherence to existing policies or regulations and provides technical guidance for HUMINT operations. The elements that provide technical control also assist teams in translating collection requirements into executable tasks. Commanders rely on the expertise of intelligence personnel organic to their unit and within higher echelons to plan, execute, and assess the HUMINT collection effort. The OMTs, HATs, and the HOC of the C/J/G/S2X provide technical control. They­

Define and manage operational coverage and direction.

Identify critical collection criteria such as indicators associated with targeting.

Prioritize collection missions III accordance with collection requirements.

• Advise teams on collection techniques and procedures in accordance with policy, regulations, and